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January, 1955
BARRY v. NEWTON - PERPETUITIES -
CONTINGENT REMAINDERS - "IF AT ALL"*
By THOMPSON G. MARSHt
The deed said, "In the event that the wall . . . shall at any
time be rebuilt .... thereupon title to the rear . . . strip herein-
above reserved shall immediately and without further conveyance
... pass to the then owner of Lot eleven..."I
The court said, "The claimed interest is an executory interest
... , and held it void for remoteness.
So far, so good; but the court after having decided that the
interest was executory, went on to say, by way of dictum, "The
rule against perpetuities is applicable to contingent remainders
... The usual effect of the rule against perpetuities is to prohibit
or invalidate attempts to create by limitation, whether executory
or by way of remainder, future interests or estates, the vesting of
which is postponed beyond the prescribed period."
'3
This is a very clear statement of a proposition that is, as a
matter of fact, not so clearly established.
Kales says, "The Rule against Perpetuities did not commence
its development until 1680, when the Duke of Norfolk's case was
decided . . . The common law contingent remainder, which was
subject to the common law rule of destructibility, had existed for
over two centuries before the Duke of Norfolk's case. There is
some opinion to the effect that the Rule against Perpetuities never
applied to such remainders. The moment, however, that the rule
of destructibility is partially abrogated, as it was by the Contingent
Remainders Act of 1845, the contingent remainder ceases to be the
common law interest which it was before, because it may, under
such act, take effect as a springing executory interest after the
termination of the proceding estate of free-hold. Under these cir-
cumstances the Rule against Perpetuities is appropriately applied
to it. The recent English cases, which appear to hold that con-
tingent remainders are subject to the Rule against Perpetuities
(citing In re Frost 4 and In re Ashforth's Trusts 5) were decided
with reference to contingent remainders to which the English
Contingent Remainders Act of 1845, at least, applied. They do not,
therefore, sustain the proposition that the Rule against Perpetuities
would apply to the common law contingent remainder which con-
tinued to be fully subject to the rule of destructibility."6
* 273 P. 2d 375, 1953-1954 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. 18.
t Professor of Law, University of Denver. A.B., M.A., LL.B., Denver; LL.M.,
Northwestern; J.S.D., Yale, 1935.
' Barry v. Newton, slifpra, p. 738.
2 Id., p. 740.
2 Id., p. 740.
4 43 Ch. Div. 246.
5 21 T.L.R. 329 (1905).




Gray says, "Whether contingent remainders are subject to the
Rule against Perpetuities has been much discussed. As the Rule
governs all shifting and springing uses and executory devises, and
all contingent limitations of personal property, whether in the form
of remainders or not, it seems very desirable that contingent re-
mainders should be subject to the Rule also. Some reasons have,
however, been suggested for exempting legal contingent remain-
ders from the operation of the Rule against Perpetuities . . .
[Then, after seventeen pages of discussion] . . . It has now been
determined that the Rule does apply to them. Re Frost. Re Ash-
forth. Whitby v. Von Luedecke."' 7 It is to be noticed that the first
two of these cases are those which Kales has cited and has dis-
tinguished as dealing with remainders to which the English Con-
tingent Remainders Act of 1845 applied. The same is true of
Whitby v. Von Luedecke,8 which dealt with interests created in 1877.
Simes says, "It has sometimes been argued that the rule should
not be applied to legal contingent remainders in land . . . [after
two pages of discussion] ... In England the question has become
one of purely academic interest by the passage of the Law of
Property Act of 1925 ... but prior to that time such authority as
existed tended in that direction [i.e., toward the applicability of
the Rule]. In the United States, while the courts do not discuss
the point, cases may be found where contingent remainders have
been held void under the rule, and such is doubtless the law." 9
Here Simes cites seven cases, each of which will be briefly com-
mented upon.
1. Owsley v. Harrison.10 The will of Carter H. Harrison pro-
vided that the residue of his estate be kept together for two years
after his death, and then, "After the expiration of said period of
two years, all of my estate . . . not disposed of as hereinabove
directed, shall be divided into four equal . . .shares . . .: One of
such shares I bequeath to each of my four children who may at
the time be alive. If either of my four children shall prior to that
time have died . . .etc . . ." It is plain, because of the two year
gap between the death of the testator and the creation of the in-
terests which the court held to be void for remoteness, that all those
interests were executory, and were not remainders of any sort
because there was no prior estate of freehold to support them.
2. Ryan v. Beshk.n Edward J. Ryan devised land to Delia
for the term of her natural life, and "Upon the death . . .of ...
Delia, I hereby give to ... James . . .Michael . . .Margaret ...
and Helen . . ., if they be living at the death of [Delia], or in the
event of the death of all or any of said persons mentioned I give
. .. his or her . . .share intended for him or her who has died
Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 4th Ed. (1942), pp. 316-333.
'(1906) 1 Ch. 783.
Simes, The Law of Future Interests (1936), No. 505.
20 60 N.E. 89, 190 Ill. 235 (1901).
"170 N.E. 699, 339 I1. 45 (1930).
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before the death . .. of .. .Delia, to his or her executor or ad-
ministrator to be applied by such as if the same had formed part
of the estate of such person . . .at his or her decease . . ." The
decision, holding the gifts to the personal representatives to be
void for remoteness has been criticized by Gray as "an obvious slip
in an otherwise excellent opinion. All the shares vested at the
termination of the life estate. The vesting of the interests of the
legatees or next of kin of a deceased remainderman did not depend
on the existence of an executor of administrator."
Even if it be conceded, in accordance with the court's inac-
curate assumption, that a gift to a personal representative is not
deemed to have vested at the death of the decedent but only upon
appointment of the personal representative, the case still is not
authority for the point for which it has been cited because it falls
squarely within the rule of Doe d. Evers v. ChaUis, 12 namely, that
"where a devise over contains two contingencies which are in their
nature divisible, and one of which can operate as a remainder,
they may . . .be divided though included in one expression . . ."
in the case of Ryan v. Beshk the gift to the personal representa-
tives of the named persons who might die before Delia does con-
tain two such contingencies: One, that the personal representative
be appointed during the continuation of Delia's life estate, in which
event the gift to the personal representative would be valid as a
common law remainder and would vest before the termination of
the life estate; the other contingency is that the personal repre-
sentative not be appointed during the continuation of Delia's life
estate, in which event the gift to the personal representative neces-
sarily would be executory because of the gap between the termina-
tion of the life estate and the appointment of the personal repre-
sentative. In other words, this was a case in which orthodox rules
called for separability by construction, and in which, as a conse-
quence of such separation, the only remote gift if any, would have
been executory.
3. Graham v. Whitridge.13 The will of George Brown set up
a trust and provided, "In case . . .Grace . . . shall not leave
living at her death, . . . any descendant . . . then . . . the said
Trustees . . . shall continue to hold . . . to and for such of
my other descendants ... in such proportions, and for ... such ...
Estates ... as ... said . . .Grace .. .may . . .appoint.. ," The
court says, "The question which this state of facts presents, and
which we are therefore called on to decide, is this, namely: Is the
will of [Grace] a valid execution of the power of appointment con-
tained in the will of . . .George Brown? . . .Are the limitations
* . .as made in . . . [Grace's] will void for remoteness under the
rule against perpetuities?" Obviously the court was dealing only
with interests created by the exercise of a power of appointment,
12 18 Q.B. 231, 7 H.L. Cas. 531 (1850, 1859).
13 57 A. 609, 99 Md. 248, 66 L.R.A. 408 (1904).
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and such interests are always executory according to the orthodox
theory of powers.
4. Lockridge v. Mace.14 Thomas J. Lockridge devised land
"unto my children now born, and which may hereafter be born,
and to the issue of their bodies, as a life-estate only, to said two
generations, ... and upon the death of my grandchildren the title
in fee-simple . . . is to vest absolutely in my great grandchildren
The court held that "The remainder in fee to the grandchildren
[is] . . . void", but it is to be noticed that it based its hold-
ing in part upon the Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell.5 "The heart of
this cause is involved in this question: Does the third clause violate
the rule respecting perpetuities?... Touching this point of perpetui-
ties, an eminent authority says: 'Still the policy of the law is
against clogging the free alienation of estates, and, as will be
shown hereafter, it has become an imperative, unyielding rule of
law-First, that no estate can be given to the unborn child of an
unborn child . . .' 1 Washb. Real Prop. (5th Ed.) . . . 'Thus if an
estate were limited to A for life, remainder to his unborn son for
life, remainder to the sons of his unborn son, the limitation would
be too remote, so far as the grandchildren were concerned, and
therefore void.' 2 Washb. Real Prop. p. 760. Charles R. Lockridge
at the death of his father, the testator, was seven and one-half
years old. The will gave him one-fourth interest in the land for
life; the remainder to his unborn children for,life; remainder in
fee to his unborn grandchildren, i.e., unborn children of unborn
children..."
5. Wood v. Griffin.0 Simes himself notes this case as, "dic-
tum".
6. In re Kountz' Estate.1 7 "The question in this case is
whether the trust created by the will of testatrix violates the rule
against perpetuities ... By her will . . . Mrs. Kountz . . . devised
and bequeathed her residuary estate as follows: . . . 'After the
decease of the last of my immediate children, and the lapse of ten
years from the date when my youngest grandchild shall have be-
come of age, the principal of the whole estate shall be equally
divided among my grandchildren' . . . Beyond doubt . . . the trust
was active ... there is no direct and explicit gift of the principal;
it is only implied from the direction to divide . . ." It is obvious
that this case does not involve a legal contingent remainder in land,
but an equitable interest in the nature of a contingent remainder
in a mixed fund.
7. Geissler v. Reading Trust Co.'8 "Bill to annul a testa-
4 18 S.W. 1145, 109 Mo. 162 (1891).
42 Ch. Div. 494, 44 Ch. Div. 85 (1890).
"46 N.H. 230 (1865).
"62 A. 1103, 213 Pa. 390, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 639, 5 Ann. Cas. 427 (1906).
"101 A. 797, 257 Pa. 329 (1917).
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mentary trust . . . Testator's will provided . . . 'After the death
of all my children and their children (my grandchildren), then I
direct that the above mentioned investments (real estate and secur-
ities) . . . shall be divided among all my great-grandchildren . . .
per capita . . .' " Held, that "The plaintiffs are entitled to a decree
declaring the aforesaid trust.., void .. ." Another case in which the
interest is not a legal remainder in land, but an equitable interest
in the nature of a remainder in a mixed fund.
Thus it appears that all of the seven cases cited by Simes in
1936 are, to say the least, inconclusive. In 1951 he states that "Con-
tingent remainders are subject to the rule."'19 and cites four cases.
Three of them, in re Frost, Graham v. Whitridge, and Geissler v.
Reading Trust Co., supra, have already been commented upon.
The fourth is Abiss v. Burney.20 ". . . The first question is
whether the rules as to remoteness apply to what has been termed
an equitable remainder, where the legal estate has been vested
in trustees under the same instrument which creates the equitable
estate. The second question is, whether the limitation with which
we have to deal in this case is an equitable remainder or an execu-
tory devise . . ." In addition to holding that the rules as to re-
moteness do apply to an equitable remainder, the court says, "Of
course, if this is a limitation by way of executory devise it is void
for remoteness . . . In my opinion, therefore, the gift . . . is an
executory limitation, and subject to all the rules with regard to
executory limitations ... "
Simes' next sentence is as follows, "It has sometimes been
said that, if contingent remainders in land are destructible, they
are not subject to the rule; but it has been held that the rule applies
to them." For this final clause there is cited In re Ashforth, supra,
which has already been commented upon and distinguished in the
above quotation from Kales.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the clear dictum in
Barry v. Newton, on a point that was not mentioned in the briefs,
that "The rule against perpetuities is applicable to contingent re-
mainders," invites scrutiny of the authorities which are cited by
the court. There are three cases: Chilcott v. Hart,21 and Madison
v. Larmon,12 in both of which the interests were held not to be
remote, and Bankers Trust Co. v. Garver,23 in which the court was
dealing, not with the rule against perpetuities, but with an Iowa
statute which provided that "Every disposition of property is
void which suspends the absolute power of controlling the same,
for a longer period than during the lives of persons then in being,
and twenty-one years thereafter." Thus it appears that the cases
which the court cites as authority for its unqualified dictum that
the rule against perpetuities applies to contingent remainders are
"Simes, Handbook on the Law of Future Interests (1951), 378.
-L.R. 17 Ch. Div. 211 (1881).
2 23 Colo. 40, 45 P. 391, 35 L.R.A. 41 (1896).
-- 170 Ill. 65, 48 N.E. 556 (1897).
222 Iowa 196, 268 N.W. 568 (1936).
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no more conclusive than are those cited by Gray and by Simes. The
doubt expressed by Kales remains.
Another misleading statement in the case of Barry v. New-
ton 24 occurs when the court first states, "The rule against perpetui-
ties is applicable to contingent remainders, and the event on the
happening of which the remainder is to vest must be one that is
certain to happen within the prescribed period, or the limitation
will be bad." It is to be noted and regretted that the all important
phrase, "IF AT ALL" is omitted from this statement of the rule,
an omission which is cured in this case, by the subsequent statement
that, "Under this rule no interest subject to condition precedent is
good unless the condition must be fulfilled, if at all, within the
period limited by the rule."
TO EACH AND EVERY MEMBER OF THE
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
DICTA is your law journal. It is written for you and it is sup-
ported by you. It is the sole purpose of DICTA to touch on legal
problems which are of interest to every Colorado lawyer. We are
aware that many of the problems which are of interest to you are
not covered in this journal. Every single lawyer in Colorado has
the opportunity to contribute to this journal. We are always happy
to receive an article or a comment by practicing attorneys.
The Editorial Staff of DICTA plans to have a spring issue
with a symposium on the general subject of EVIDENCE. We
would greatly appreciate an article or comment in this field from
you.
We hope that in the future we will continue to receive your
writing, and in that manner further the purpose of DICTA in serv-
ing you as a Colorado lawyer.
Please address all writing or comments to Mr. Arnold M.
Chutkow, 750 Equitable Bldg., Denver, Colo., or to Mr. Richard
Harvey, University of Denver College of Law, Denver, Colo.
ATTENTION SUBSCRIBER!
As announced in the July issue, the 30 year subject-author
index to DICTA is ready for your use. The students and attorneys
who have compiled the information feel that this publication will
be an invaluable aid in your library. This 85 page booklet, at a
printing cost to us of $2.00, is being made available to you as a
service of DICTA with no attempt to profit therefrom.
Please mail all checks to Mr. John Brooks, University of
Denver College of Law, with the checks made to the University
of Denver.
We sincerely solicit your support.
Thank you,
V. G. SEAVY, JR., Managing Editor.
24 Supra, p. 740.
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